{"id":4848,"date":"2025-09-29T20:51:50","date_gmt":"2025-09-30T03:51:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/?p=4848"},"modified":"2025-09-29T20:51:50","modified_gmt":"2025-09-30T03:51:50","slug":"the-reichsmarschalls-decline-hermann-gorings-retreat-from-command","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/2025\/09\/29\/the-reichsmarschalls-decline-hermann-gorings-retreat-from-command\/","title":{"rendered":"The Reichsmarschall’s Decline: Hermann G\u00f6ring’s Retreat from Command"},"content":{"rendered":"

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\nA Study in Administrative Failure and the Erosion of Military Authority, 1940-1945<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

In the opening campaigns of World War II, G\u00f6ring’s air force proved instrumental in securing Germany’s lightning victories<\/strong><\/span>\u2014the swift subjugation of Poland in autumn 1939 and the stunning defeat of France by June 1940. These triumphs earned him the F\u00fchrer’s ultimate accolade: appointment as Reichsmarschall, a rank held by no other officer in the Third Reich. Alongside this military elevation, G\u00f6ring assumed responsibility for systematically plundering the wealth of conquered territories, directing the confiscation of assets across occupied Europe.<\/p>\n

Yet by late 1940, cracks in G\u00f6ring’s competence emerged when his air force failed to deliver on his audacious guarantee to neutralize Britain’s aerial defenses during the Battle of Britain.<\/strong><\/span> Within two years, the organizational structure he had built around the Luftwaffe revealed itself as a cumbersome, over-bureaucratized apparatus riddled with inefficiencies. As Germany’s strategic position deteriorated, Hitler began systematically stripping G\u00f6ring of his responsibilities throughout 1942 and 1943, redistributing critical functions to more reliable subordinates. The Reichsmarschall’s standing with the F\u00fchrer collapsed entirely as Allied bomber formations increasingly penetrated German airspace with impunity, exposing the Luftwaffe’s inability to fulfill its fundamental defensive mission.<\/p>\n

During the war’s final phase, G\u00f6ring effectively abandoned his command obligations, retreating instead to his sprawling country estates where he indulged in opulent living surrounded by masterworks and precious objects obtained through systematic theft and official corruption.<\/p>\n

The Architecture of Dysfunction: How G\u00f6ring’s Administration Failed Germany<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The Illusion of Competence (1939-1940)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Hermann G\u00f6ring entered World War II at the apex of his power and influence within Nazi Germany. As Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Minister of Aviation, and Hitler’s designated successor, he wielded authority that extended far beyond military aviation into economic planning, industrial production, and foreign policy. His reputation rested primarily on the Luftwaffe’s performance during the Polish campaign, where German air superiority proved decisive, and the subsequent Western offensive that brought France to its knees in mere weeks.<\/p>\n

These early victories, however, masked fundamental weaknesses in G\u00f6ring’s leadership style and the institutional structures he had created. The Reichsmarschall possessed neither the technical expertise nor the managerial discipline required to oversee a modern air force engaged in total war.<\/strong><\/span> His approach to administration favored personal loyalty over professional competence, resulting in a leadership cadre more skilled at political maneuvering than strategic planning.<\/p>\n

The Battle of Britain: The First Catastrophic Failure<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The Luftwaffe’s defeat in the skies over Britain during the summer and autumn of 1940 marked the beginning of G\u00f6ring’s irreversible decline. His notorious boast that no enemy aircraft would penetrate German airspace\u2014and conversely, that his forces would bring Britain to submission through aerial bombardment\u2014proved catastrophically wrong. The reasons for this failure were numerous and complex, but many traced directly to G\u00f6ring’s command inadequacies.<\/p>\n

He consistently underestimated both the technological sophistication of British radar installations and the tactical flexibility of RAF Fighter Command.<\/strong> <\/span>His strategic decisions during the campaign revealed a commander out of touch with operational realities: he repeatedly changed targeting priorities, dispersing effort rather than concentrating force; he withdrew fighter escorts prematurely, leaving bomber formations vulnerable; and he demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the attrition mathematics that governed aerial warfare.<\/p>\n

Perhaps most damaging to his credibility was G\u00f6ring’s insistence on personally directing operations from his luxurious headquarters in France, where he remained geographically and psychologically removed from the pilots who were dying daily in increasingly futile missions. His subordinate commanders\u2014including more capable officers like Albert Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle\u2014found themselves hamstrung by the Reichsmarschall’s interference and his refusal to acknowledge tactical realities.<\/p>\n

The Bureaucratic Labyrinth (1941-1942)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

By 1941, the organizational dysfunction within G\u00f6ring’s sphere of authority had become impossible to ignore.<\/strong><\/span> The Luftwaffe’s command structure had evolved into a Byzantine maze of overlapping jurisdictions, competing agencies, and redundant departments. This administrative chaos stemmed directly from G\u00f6ring’s management philosophy, which deliberately created rival power centers to prevent any single subordinate from accumulating too much influence.<\/p>\n

The Air Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium) had ballooned into a massive bureaucracy that consumed resources while producing diminishing returns. Multiple departments claimed authority over aircraft production, pilot training, research and development, and strategic planning. Decisions that should have taken days required months as proposals circulated through endless channels of approval. Meanwhile, Germany’s enemies\u2014particularly the Soviet Union and the United States\u2014were rapidly expanding their own air capabilities.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6ring’s parallel responsibilities for economic planning through the Four-Year Plan further complicated matters. He had neither the expertise nor the attention span to effectively coordinate aircraft production with overall industrial capacity, strategic material allocation, and workforce management. As Germany’s resource constraints tightened with the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, these coordination failures became critical vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n

The Reichsmarschall’s response to mounting evidence of administrative failure was characteristic: denial, delegation to feuding subordinates, and retreat into fantasy.<\/strong><\/span> Rather than undertaking the difficult work of organizational reform, he increasingly absented himself from substantive decision-making, attending fewer meetings and spending less time engaged with technical details. His subordinates learned to work around him, making decisions in his name while the actual commander indulged his various appetites.<\/p>\n

Hitler’s Loss of Confidence and the Redistribution of Power<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The year 1942 proved pivotal in G\u00f6ring’s fall from grace. As German forces became bogged down in Russia and Allied strategic bombing of German cities intensified, Hitler’s patience with his Reichsmarschall evaporated. The F\u00fchrer began systematically transferring G\u00f6ring’s responsibilities to other officials whom he believed would execute policy more effectively.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Most significantly, Hitler appointed Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments and War Production in February 1942, effectively ending G\u00f6ring’s control over the German war economy. Speer’s streamlined approach to industrial management stood in stark contrast to G\u00f6ring’s bloated bureaucracy, and aircraft production increased substantially under the new regime\u2014though by then, Germany faced insurmountable disadvantages in resources and manpower.<\/p>\n

Field Marshal Erhard Milch, G\u00f6ring’s own deputy in the Luftwaffe, increasingly bypassed his superior to work directly with Speer and other officials. By 1943, Milch had assumed operational control over many functions that nominally remained G\u00f6ring’s responsibility. The Reichsmarschall’s isolation within his own organization became nearly complete as competent officers realized that actual authority lay elsewhere.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Hitler’s contempt for G\u00f6ring became increasingly apparent in private conversations and public forums. Where once the F\u00fchrer had relied on his old comrade for counsel on political and military matters, he now rarely consulted him on important decisions. In staff meetings, Hitler would openly mock G\u00f6ring’s failures, particularly the Luftwaffe’s inability to protect German cities or to maintain air superiority on any front.<\/p>\n

The Collapse of Air Defense (1943-1945)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Nothing damaged G\u00f6ring’s credibility more comprehensively than the Luftwaffe’s failure to defend the Reich against Anglo-American bombing raids.<\/strong><\/span> His 1939 boast\u2014“If an enemy bomber reaches the Ruhr, my name is not Hermann G\u00f6ring!”<\/strong><\/em><\/span>\u2014became a bitter joke as Allied aircraft appeared over German cities with increasing frequency and devastating effect.<\/p>\n

The reasons for this defensive collapse were partly beyond G\u00f6ring’s control: the Allies possessed overwhelming material superiority, technological advantages in navigation and bombing aids, and seemingly inexhaustible resources. However, many factors stemmed directly from decisions made\u2014or avoided\u2014by the Reichsmarschall himself.<\/p>\n

Germany had neglected the development of an integrated air defense system during the years when victory seemed assured. Radar networks, fighter production, anti-aircraft artillery, and civil defense preparations all suffered from inadequate investment and poor coordination. When the strategic situation demanded rapid adaptation, the sclerotic bureaucracy G\u00f6ring had created proved incapable of responding effectively.<\/p>\n

Fighter production, while increasing under Speer’s management, consistently fell short of requirements due to competing priorities and strategic confusion. The Luftwaffe consumed fighters on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean while German cities burned. G\u00f6ring never established clear priorities or forced difficult trade-offs between offensive and defensive operations.<\/p>\n

Perhaps most damaging was the Reichsmarschall’s refusal to champion jet aircraft development with the urgency the situation demanded. The Messerschmitt Me 262, potentially a war-changing weapons system, suffered from production delays, strategic confusion about its proper employment, and Hitler’s disastrous insistence on modifying it as a bomber. G\u00f6ring’s inability to effectively advocate for or manage this critical program exemplified his complete failure as a military leader.<\/p>\n

The Retreat into Self-Indulgence<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Carinhall and the Cult of Luxury<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

As his official duties became increasingly burdensome and his relationship with Hitler deteriorated, G\u00f6ring withdrew into a private world of ostentatious luxury centered on his vast estate, Carinhall, located in the Schorfheide forest north of Berlin.<\/strong><\/span> Named after his deceased first wife, Carin, this sprawling complex embodied G\u00f6ring’s grandiose vision of himself as a Renaissance prince rather than a military commander engaged in existential struggle.<\/p>\n

Carinhall expanded continuously throughout the war years, even as ordinary Germans endured rationing and Allied bombing. The main residence resembled a hunting lodge of imperial proportions, featuring great halls adorned with medieval weapons, Renaissance paintings, and sculptures looted from across occupied Europe. G\u00f6ring employed architects, craftsmen, and decorators full-time to maintain and enhance his personal domain while the Reich’s infrastructure crumbled.<\/p>\n

The Reichsmarschall maintained several other residences of similar opulence, including a Berlin palace and hunting lodges scattered across Germany. Each served as a repository for his ever-expanding collection of art, jewels, and precious objects. Visitors reported rooms so crowded with treasures that navigating them required care to avoid knocking over priceless antiquities.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Systematic Plunder of Europe<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

G\u00f6ring’s art collection represented not merely personal greed but systematic theft on a continental scale. As the official responsible for coordinating the economic exploitation of occupied territories, he possessed both the authority and the opportunity to acquire virtually anything that caught his acquisitive eye.<\/p>\n

In France, particularly after the 1940 armistice, G\u00f6ring personally oversaw the confiscation of art collections belonging to Jewish families, private collectors, and museums. The Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), ostensibly under Alfred Rosenberg’s authority, frequently coordinated with G\u00f6ring’s agents to identify and secure valuable works. The Reichsmarschall made numerous personal trips to Paris to inspect looted art, selecting pieces for his private collection before allowing lesser works to be distributed elsewhere.<\/p>\n

This pattern repeated across occupied Europe. In the Netherlands, Poland, and the Soviet Union, G\u00f6ring’s representatives identified valuable cultural properties for confiscation. His agents operated with explicit authority backed by military force, making resistance futile for dispossessed owners. The scale of this theft was staggering: estimates suggest G\u00f6ring accumulated over 1,500 paintings alone, along with countless sculptures, tapestries, and decorative objects.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The corruption extended beyond art to include jewels, precious metals, and even mundane luxury goods unavailable to ordinary Germans. G\u00f6ring’s lavish lifestyle\u2014fine wines, gourmet cuisine, expensive cigars, and custom-made uniforms adorned with medals and decorations of his own design\u2014stood in grotesque contrast to the privations endured by German civilians and the unspeakable suffering inflicted on millions under Nazi occupation.<\/p>\n

The Morphine Addiction and Physical Decline<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Compounding G\u00f6ring’s professional failures was his long-standing addiction to morphine and similar opiates, which had begun after he was wounded during the failed Munich Putsch of 1923. Although he underwent treatment in the 1920s, he appears to have relapsed under the pressures of war, with access to pharmaceutical supplies making sustained abuse easy for someone of his position.<\/p>\n

The physical effects became increasingly apparent. G\u00f6ring’s weight fluctuated wildly, sometimes exceeding 300 pounds, as his drug use alternated with periods of attempted abstinence. His elaborate uniforms required constant alteration to accommodate his changing physique. The psychological effects\u2014mood swings, paranoia, lethargy, and impaired judgment\u2014almost certainly influenced his administrative failures and Hitler’s growing distrust.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Medical records and testimony from those who worked closely with G\u00f6ring suggest he spent significant portions of the later war years in drug-induced stupors, unavailable for critical decisions and unable to focus on complex administrative matters. His public appearances became less frequent and more erratic. Where once he had been an energetic, if undisciplined, administrator, he devolved into a figure more concerned with his next dose than the Reich’s survival.<\/p>\n

Quotes About Hermann G\u00f6ring from Nazi Officials and Military Leaders<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Albert Speer (Minister of Armaments and War Production)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

From his memoir Inside the Third Reich<\/em>:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Speer described G\u00f6ring as “very intelligent but lazy”<\/strong><\/em><\/span> and noted that “he managed to screw up every project that he touched.”<\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

This assessment is particularly damning, coming from Speer, who directly replaced G\u00f6ring in managing Germany’s war economy and witnessed firsthand the chaos and inefficiency of G\u00f6ring’s administration.<\/p>\n

Adolf Galland (Luftwaffe Fighter Ace and General)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

One of the most famous incidents illustrating the relationship between G\u00f6ring and his own pilots occurred during the Battle of Britain. Just before the major bomber assault on London, G\u00f6ring came to the French coast to confront his fighter leaders. Galland and Werner M\u00f6lders stood facing “an abrasive and reproachful Reich Marshal”<\/strong><\/em><\/span> who accused the Fighter Arm of lacking “fighting spirit” <\/strong><\/em><\/span>responded by asking for “a squadron of Spitfires”<\/strong><\/em><\/span>\u2014essentially telling G\u00f6ring that the British aircraft were superior and that his pilots were being sent into battle with inadequate resources and impossible orders.<\/p>\n

Galland “defied Reichsmarshal Hermann G\u00f6ring” <\/strong><\/em><\/span>throughout his career, and his career involved defending “his own pilots”<\/strong> <\/em><\/span>in “the bizarre bureaucracy of the Luftwaffe High Command”<\/strong> <\/em><\/span>against G\u00f6ring’s unrealistic demands and poor strategic decisions.<\/p>\n

\r\n
\r\n Author’s Note: I met Adolf Galland and British pilot, Robert Stanford Tuck, in Atlanta in 1978 during a talk that was held for a small gathering of history enthusiasts.<\/strong><\/em><\/span>\r\n <\/div>\r\n <\/div>\n

The 1978 Washington, D.C. Area Visit<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

In November 1978, Adolf Galland and Robert Stanford Tuck were in the Arlington, Virginia area (part of the greater Washington D.C. region) to promote prints of a painting by British artist Frank Wootton that depicted their dogfight at 14,000 feet over the French coast during the Battle of Britain. The event was organized to raise money for the Battle of Britain Museum and the RAF Benevolent Fund.<\/p>\n

The Washington Post covered their appearance in an article titled “Best of Enemies”<\/strong><\/span> on November 16, 1978, describing their friendly banter about the war.<\/p>\n

Robert Stanford Tuck<\/strong><\/span> was the British pilot! He was a highly decorated RAF ace who was shot down while flying his Spitfire, taken prisoner, entertained by Galland and officers of JG26 before being sent to a POW camp, escaped in early 1945, and ended up fighting with Russian infantry before returning home before VE Day. His friendship with Galland continued over the years. They also traveled to Atlanta during that same trip on a similar speaking tour.<\/p>\n

General Military Assessment<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The relationship between G\u00f6ring and his subordinates, particularly frontline commanders like Galland, deteriorated throughout the war as his incompetence became increasingly evident. Fighter pilots and other Luftwaffe officers found themselves caught between the impossible operational demands from G\u00f6ring’s headquarters and the reality of fighting against numerically and technologically superior Allied forces.<\/p>\n

The “Spitfire incident” with Galland has become emblematic of G\u00f6ring’s disconnect from operational reality\u2014when his best pilots told him what they actually needed, he responded with anger rather than addressing the systemic problems in the Luftwaffe.<\/p>\n

These assessments from insiders like Speer and frontline commanders like Galland paint a picture consistent with the historical consensus: G\u00f6ring was intelligent but fundamentally lazy, out of touch with reality, prone to blaming subordinates for his own failures, and increasingly irrelevant to Germany’s actual war effort.<\/p>\n

The Final Act: April 1945 and the Ultimate Betrayal<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The Berchtesgaden Telegram<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

G\u00f6ring’s final humiliation came in the war’s closing days. On April 23, 1945, with Hitler isolated in his Berlin bunker and Soviet forces closing in, G\u00f6ring sent a telegram from Berchtesgaden asking whether he should assume leadership of the Reich given the F\u00fchrer’s apparent inability to govern from the besieged capital.<\/strong> <\/span>The message was carefully worded to express loyalty while seeking clarification of the succession arrangements Hitler had established years earlier.<\/p>\n

Hitler, influenced by Martin Bormann (who saw an opportunity to eliminate a rival), interpreted the telegram as treason and an attempted coup. In a rage, he stripped G\u00f6ring of all ranks, titles, and offices, expelling him from the Nazi Party and ordering his arrest.<\/strong> <\/span>The Reichsmarschall, who had been Hitler’s designated successor since 1939 and among the earliest of Nazi Party members, found himself branded a traitor in the regime’s final days.<\/p>\n

This denouement was fitting in its way. G\u00f6ring, who had systematically failed in his duties for years while indulging his appetites, ended his career with an ill-judged telegram that confirmed Hitler’s assessment of his incompetence and disloyalty. The man who had once stood second only to the F\u00fchrer finished the war under house arrest, waiting for the inevitable Allied arrival.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Historical Assessment: A Study in Failed Leadership<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The Consequences of Administrative Incompetence<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Hermann G\u00f6ring’s failure to effectively execute his responsibilities had profound consequences for Nazi Germany’s war effort. While no single individual could have overcome the strategic overreach, resource limitations, and moral bankruptcy that doomed the Third Reich, G\u00f6ring’s incompetence accelerated Germany’s defeat and increased the suffering inflicted on both Germans and their victims.<\/p>\n

Had the Luftwaffe been led by a more capable commander\u2014one who understood modern air warfare, could manage complex organizations, and possessed the moral courage to speak truth to Hitler\u2014Germany’s military performance might have been significantly better, potentially prolonging the war with attendant increases in human suffering. Alternatively, a more effective opposition to Hitler’s worst strategic blunders might have emerged from competent military leadership.<\/p>\n

The administrative chaos G\u00f6ring created consumed resources desperately needed elsewhere. The bloated bureaucracies, redundant agencies, and competing power centers absorbed personnel, materiel, and attention that could have been directed toward actual military operations. The corruption he modeled and tolerated permeated the entire system, undermining meritocracy and effective governance.<\/p>\n

The Enabler of Atrocity<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

While G\u00f6ring’s administrative failures and personal corruption are historically significant, they pale beside his role in enabling Nazi atrocities.<\/strong><\/span> As one of Hitler’s most powerful subordinates, he bore direct responsibility for crimes against humanity that transcended mere military incompetence.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6ring chaired the conference that ordered Reinhard Heydrich to develop a “final solution to the Jewish question.”<\/strong> <\/em><\/span>He signed orders for the economic exploitation of occupied territories that condemned millions to starvation and forced labor. His systematic looting of Jewish property in particular represented not merely personal greed but participation in genocide\u2014the theft of possessions from families being murdered in the Holocaust.<\/p>\n

His retreat from duty into luxury during the war’s final years, while millions died in combat, concentration camps, and bombed cities, revealed a moral vacancy that no assessment of his administrative failures can fully capture. He lived in opulent splendor surrounded by stolen treasures while the civilization he claimed to serve collapsed in flames.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion: The Reichsmarschall Who Preferred Plunder to Duty<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Hermann G\u00f6ring’s trajectory from Hitler’s most powerful subordinate to a marginalized, drug-addicted collector exemplifies how personal weakness and moral corruption can manifest as institutional failure with catastrophic consequences. His inability to fulfill his official duties stemmed not from lack of opportunity or resources but from fundamental deficiencies of character, competence, and commitment.<\/p>\n

The Luftwaffe’s failures in Britain, over Germany, and on all fronts reflected its commander’s failures as a leader and administrator. The bureaucratic dysfunction that hampered German aircraft production and air operations originated in G\u00f6ring’s mismanagement and his prioritization of personal power over institutional effectiveness. The increasing assignment of his responsibilities to others represented not merely Hitler’s loss of confidence but the system’s attempt to work around a failed leader who refused to resign.<\/p>\n

Most damningly, G\u00f6ring’s retreat into self-indulgent luxury while Germany burned\u2014his preference for inspecting stolen art over directing air defense, for hosting lavish parties over managing aircraft production, for drug-induced escape over confronting failure\u2014revealed the emptiness at the core of Nazi leadership. The Reichsmarschall’s decline paralleled and accelerated that of the regime itself: bloated, corrupt, detached from reality, and ultimately collapsing under the weight of its own crimes and incompetence.<\/p>\n

For historians studying the Nazi regime’s administrative structure and military performance, G\u00f6ring provides a case study in how individual failure can propagate through institutions to affect historical outcomes. His story serves as a reminder that in total war, leadership failures are measured not merely in lost opportunities or squandered resources but in human lives\u2014both those who suffered under Nazi occupation and those Germans who paid the price for their leaders’ catastrophic misjudgments.<\/p>\n

The Reichsmarschall who preferred plunder to duty remains a symbol of the Third Reich’s moral and administrative bankruptcy, a cautionary tale of how power without competence or character inevitably leads to disaster.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A Study in Administrative Failure and the Erosion of Military Authority, 1940-1945 In the opening campaigns of World War II, G\u00f6ring’s air force proved instrumental in securing Germany’s lightning victories\u2014the swift subjugation of Poland in autumn 1939 and the stunning defeat of France by June 1940. These triumphs earned him the F\u00fchrer’s ultimate accolade: appointment…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[181,174],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4848","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-history","category-world-war-ii"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4848","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4848"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4848\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4848"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4848"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novus2.com\/righteouscause\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4848"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}