(photo credit: Canva, REUTERS/MAHMOUD HASSANO, SANA/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
NY Times, December 7, 2024: In the Syrian Regime’s Hour of Need, Its Patron Iran Makes an Exit
A collapse of Iran’s partnership with Syria would by all accounts reshape the balance of power in the Middle East. The “axis of resistance” that Iran has formed with its militant allies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Iraq and Yemen would be weakened. Israel and its Arab allies would be strengthened.
Iran has experienced a significant strategic setback with the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. The loss of the Syrian land and air corridor has critically impaired Iran’s ability to resupply and rebuild Hezbollah, which has been weakened. The vast resources Iran poured into supporting Assad’s government have essentially been squandered.
This development has dismantled what was known as Iran’s “forward defense” strategy, which aimed to create a buffer zone and extend its influence right up to Israel’s borders. The concept of a “ring of fire” around Israel, intended to keep pressure on and threaten Israel from multiple fronts, has now been severely disrupted. With the Assad government no longer in control, Iran’s strategic positioning in the region has been undone, leaving its regional ambitions in disarray.
In light of Assad’s defeat in Syria, Iran’s likely responses include:
Reevaluation and Consolidation of Influence:
Iran will likely reassess its regional strategy, focusing on consolidating its influence in areas where it still holds sway, like parts of Syria outside the immediate control of the new powers, Iraq, and Lebanon. The aim would be to maintain some level of geopolitical leverage despite the setback.
Support for Remaining Militias:
Iran might increase its support for pro-Iranian militias within Syria to maintain a presence and influence, even if not at the governmental level. This could involve arming, funding, and advising these groups to carve out areas of control or to act as a destabilizing force against any new government.
Diplomatic Maneuvering:
Diplomatically, Iran could seek to negotiate or form new alliances with anti-Assad forces or countries that have influence in the new Syrian landscape. This might involve a pragmatic approach to engage with Turkey, Russia, or even some of the opposition groups to secure its interests.
Focus on Hezbollah:
With the Syrian land route compromised, Iran might shift more of its resources to directly supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. This could mean increasing the supply of weapons through alternative routes (like maritime or via Iraq) and strengthening Hezbollah’s capabilities to act independently or as a deterrent against Israel.
Potential Military Response:
There might be considerations for a military response to protect its remaining assets and personnel in Syria, although the posts on X suggest a reluctance for conventional warfare, indicating Iran might use its forces more defensively or through asymmetric warfare tactics.
Internal Stabilization:
Domestically, Iran could focus on stabilizing its own political and economic situation, which might have strained the costs of supporting Assad. The government would likely use this scenario to rally nationalistic support, framing the situation as part of a larger struggle against external enemies.
Propaganda and Information Warfare:
Iran would continue or intensify its use of propaganda to counter any narrative of defeat, portraying its involvement in Syria as part of a broader, ongoing resistance against Western and Israeli interests.
These actions reflect a strategic pivot to mitigate losses and adapt to new geopolitical realities. However, the exact nature and extent of these responses would depend on how the situation in Syria evolves, the reactions of other regional players, and Iran’s internal political and military calculations.